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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 59

April, 1957

Number 3

DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LESTEm B. OiRmLD*

I. History of Drafting of Rule 16
Rule 16 entitled "Discovery and Inspection" of the Federal
Criminal Rules provides:
"Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of
the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for
the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects,
obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from
others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items
sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that
the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the inspection and of taking copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just."
Rule 34 of the First Draft of the Federal Criminal Rules, dated
September 8, 1941, entitled "Discovery and Production of Documents and Things for Inspection. Copying or Photographing", was
modeled largely on Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
It provided: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor
and upon notice to all other parties, the court in which the proceeding is pending may, subject to the privileges and rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (1) order any party
to permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privi* Professor of Law, Indiana University; Member United States Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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leged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the proceeding and which are in his possession, custody,
or control; or (2) order any party to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose
of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection
and taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just." The committee for the Southern District
of Florida had proposed on April 7, 1941, that there be a rule permitting the discovery and production on motion of the defendant
of documents and things for inspection, copying or photographing,
in cases in which the evidence of the government relates to documents and things; and permitting the court to order that the defendant be permitted to attend with his expert upon government
examinations relating to ballistics, fingerprints, blood, semen, and
other stains in cases where evidence of that type is to be used by
the government.
Rule 56 of the Second Draft, dated January 12, 1942, bore a
new title "Discovery and Production of Documents and Objects."
It provided: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing by or on behalf of the
moving party of any designated letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which are in his possession, custody,
or control, or [and], which constitute or contain evidence which
would be admissible at the trial on behalf of the moving party. No
such order shall be made against any defendant who asserts that
such evidence may incriminate him." The Committee Comment
pointed out that the rule was considerably narrower than Civil Rule
34. The principal difference was the provision as to self-incrimination. In the second place the rule is limited to evidence admissible
in behalf of the moving party. In the third place it omits all reference to entry upon property. The draftsman stated that the rule
is somewhat futile in criminal cases, but is presented for committee
consideration. It operates only in favor of the defendant, except in
the unusual situation in which one defendant has evidence that
might help to convict a co-defendant, without affecting the defendant in whose possession it is found. It is doubtful whether a remedy
should be given to a defendant when none can be given to the
prosecution. No analogous provision existed in the prior federal
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law. The rule was endorsed by the Committee for the Southern
District of Florida and by Lawrence Koenigsberger of the District
of Columbia, but opposed by F. F. Faville, chairman of the Committee for the Northern District of Iowa and by a Department of
Justice Committee.
Rule 54 entitled "Pre-Trial Procedure" of the Third Draft, dated
March 4, 1942, incorporated the prior rule, and provided: "At any
time after the filing of the accusation the court may invite the attorneys for the government and for the defendant to appear before it
for a conference to consider . . . (4) Discovery and production,

prior to the trial, of documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, or objects which are not privileged and which are in
possession of one of the parties." Rule 18 of the Fourth Draft, dated
May 18, 1942, struck the above provision and instead provided:
"The court may, although the attorneys do not consent, make such
order not violative of legal or constitutional privilege, for discovery
and inspection, and for such other aid to the expeditious conduct of
the trial as may be just." Rule 18 of the Fifth Draft, dated June 1942,
omitted the language just quoted and was silent as to discovery and
inspection. This draft was submitted to the Supreme Court for
comment. No criticism was offered by the Court.
Rule 19 entitled "Discovery and Inspection" of the Sixth Draft,
dated Winter 1942-1943 was new. The Fifth Draft had omitted
any reference to this subject. The new rule was prepared by the
late Professor George H. Dession, who also prepared a research
study and a note to accompany the rule. The proposed rule provided: "Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing
of the indictment or information and after the defendant has been
taken into custody the court may order the attorney for the government to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated books, papers, documents, grand jury minutes and exhibits,
or tangible objects, not privileged, upon a showing in good faith
that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is otherwise reasonable. The order shall
specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and
taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just."
Rule 19 of a draft dated March 1943 known as "Preliminary
Draft" between the Sixth and Seventh Drafts made some changes.
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The words "grand jury minutes and exhibits" were omitted, as were
the words "in good faith" and "otherwise". The Committee note
made it clear that the rule does not provide for inspection of grand
jury minutes, and that in the past such inspection had been infrequently granted. Rule 19 of the First Preliminary Draft, dated May
1948 (the seventh Committee draft) made no changes. Rule 18 of
the Second Preliminary Draft, dated February 1944 (the eighth
committee draft) made some changes. It now employed the language "after he has been arraigned" instead of "after the defendant
has been taken into custody." It added the limitation "obtained
from or belonging to the defendant or constituting evidence in the
proceeding" to the things that may be inspected and copied. Rule
18 of the Report of the Advisory Committee, dated July 1944 (ninth
draft) made some changes. The words "and after he has been arraigned" were omitted. The words "or obtained from others by
seizure or by process" were substituted for "or constituting evidence
in the proceeding." The Supreme Court made no change with respect to the ninth draft. Because two prior proposed rules were
rejected by the Court, the rule became Rule 16.
Many comments were made to the Advisory Committee on this
rule. With respect to the First Preliminary Draft District Judge
Merrill E. Otis of the Western District of Missouri would compel
the government to make discovery only where the "books, documents and papers are in the custody and under the control of the
attorney for the government."' District Judge C. C. Wyche of the
Western District of South Carolina thought that the word "privileged" should be clearly defined. District Judge T. C. Trimble of
the Eastern District of Arkansas stated: "It is not intended by this
rule to require the United States Attorney to disclose his case to the
defendant, but to secure to the defendant sufficient information to
enable him to prepare his defense." Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorey General in charge of the Criminal Division stated: "A strong
case for disclosure can obviously be made out where the matter
sought is an object which is itself evidence and to be used as a basis
for expert testimony. Questioned documents, fingerprints and ballistics exhibits, and the like would fall in this category. Beyond
this we move into less well charted ground. Under the heading of
papers and documents we will have a great variety of material raising a variety of problems. Should the defendant ever be permitted
1 1 Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Received Concerning
the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 128 (1948).
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to inspect statements of witnesses before trial? Should he be permitted to inspect the statement or confession of a co-defendant?
Should he ever be permitted to inspect the minutes of a grand jury,
or the transcript of an administrative investigatory hearing? It is
stated in the note that the rule does not provide for the inspection
of grand jury minutes, but there is nothing in the rules which
expressly excludes this. The rule requires a showing that the items
sought are material to the preparation of the defense. This is broad
enough to include items which would not be admissible evidence
at the trial. Should not disclosure be limited to material evidence?
The prevailing policy has been to grant disclosure of these kinds
very sparingly if at all. If no change in that policy is contemplated,
the rule is misleadingly broad in its language. Should not the limitations at least with respect to statements of witnesses, memoranda
and notes of the prosecutor, and grand jury minutes be written into
the rule?"2 Joseph T. Votava, United States Attorney for the District
of Nebraska objected to applying the theory of the civil rules to
criminal cases, and thought that the rule would permit fishing
expeditions. The language "not privileged" was ambiguous. The
rule should go no further than existing law or preferably be eliminated. Charles E. Dierker, United States Attorney for the Western
District of Oklahoma would eliminate the rule as it might permit
extended fishing expeditions. 3 Walter C. Lindley, United States
District Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois objected that the
word "privileged" is of no certain meaning, and also feared that
fishing expeditions might occur.4 Robert N. Wilkin, District Judge
for the Northern District of Ohio suggested that departmental
reports be excepted from the rule together with privileged documents. The United States Attorney should not be required to
turn over a copy of the investigator's report. The rule should be
restricted to such papers and objects "as may be used in evidence."
The federal judges of Michigan objected to the rule on the ground
that it permitted fishing expeditions. Thomas J. Morrissey, United
States Attorney for the District of Colorado, objected that the rule
"would compel a complete disclosure of the government's case."
Victor E. Anderson, United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota, objected to the rule as permitting fishing expeditions. 5
2
3

Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.

42

id. at 426.

Gid. at 427.
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Elmer L. Irey, Chief Coordinator of the Treasury Enforcement
Agencies stated: "This rule should be clarified so as to define what
is meant by the words 'designated' and 'not privileged'. The Government should not be required to disclose its confidential documents or data containing information given by persons not to be
called as witnesses." Robert S. Rubin, Special Counsel of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, thought the rule too broad.
There is no objection to giving the defendant access to material
which he can show was at one time in his possession or used by
him. But the government's evidence should not be available to him.
The words "not privileged" should be defined. Joseph F. Deeb,
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan stated:
"This rule appears to be too broad for practical application. It is
unrestricted in that the statements of witnesses in the possession of
the government may be ordered inspected and copied by the defendant. The same applies to statements of co-defendants, minutes,
records and possibly transcripts of Grand Jury proceedings may
be ordered turned over to the defendant

...

The rule should be

restricted to allow for inspection by the defendant of questioned
documents, finger-print and kindred exhibits and no more."6 George
F. Kneip of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
thought that the rule would be "a veritable Pandora's Box." The
word "privileged" was not clear. The words "moving party" should
read "defendant" as only he could fie the motion. Joseph W. Bums
of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice thought the
rule unclear in scope. 7 If limited to inspection of tangible objects
belonging to the defendant, or if not belonging to him actually used
in the commission of the crime, the rule was proper but stated no
new rule. Books and papers obtained by the government from third
persons should not be made available to the defendant even though
material to the case and to the preparation of the defense.
With respect to the Second Preliminary Draft there were also
many comments. The Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit
adopted a motion that the language "constituting evidence in
the proceeding" was too broad.8 The rule should not include all
documents, such as statements of witnesses obtained by the prosecution. Bascom S. Deaver, District Judge of the Middle District
6Id. at 428.
7Id. at 429.
8

3 id. at 74 (1944).
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of Georgia, objecting to requiring that the motion be made "after
arraignment" as delays and continuances would result. The defendant should 'be able to move after indictment. In many districts
arraignments come long after indictment. Robert P. Butler, United
States Attorney for the District of Connecticut thought the language
"or constituting evidence in the proceeding" too loose.9 The government might be compelled to disclose confidential evidence and
the identity of witnesses. There should be a provision for confidential disclosure to the court in the absence of the defendant and
his counsel of the reasons why the materials sought should not be
disclosed before trial. Matthew F. McGuire of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia was pleased that discretionary power was placed in the court as there would be a
plethora of motions made leading to grave abuses unless watched
and used sparingly. Ralph F. Leseman of the Bar Committee for
the Seventh Circuit thought that statements secured by investigating
officers from possible witnesses other than the defendant should be
specifically excluded from the operation of the rule.10 The word
"specifically" should be inserted before the word "designated." Lloyd
P. Stryker argued that the rule be amended so as to provide in a
proper case for inspection of grand jury minutes to the end that
an indictment based upon illegal evidence may be quashed before
trial. The Philadelphia Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
adopted a motion that the words "or constituting evidence in the
preceding" be stricken out. 11 A motion that the word "and" be
substituted for "or? as to this phraseology was disapproved. The
Conference of United States Attorneys at St. Louis thought that
the proposed rule was a rule of evidence which should be built up,
step by step, rather than by a brief statement or rule. The rule
should not go beyond existing law. The language "or constituting
evidence in the proceedings" is too broad and should be stricken
out; otherwise the entire rule should be eliminated. Harold M.
Kennedy, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, also objected to this language as it allows a defendant to call
for reports, grand jury exhibits "in fact, almost anything." The Special Committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association would substitute
the language "the court shall order" instead of "the court may
order."' 2 It would insert after the words "tangible objects" the words
9Id. at 75.
lo Id.at 75a.
l4 id. at 42 (1944).
12 Id.at 43.
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"or specimens". After the word "photographs" in the last sentence
of the rule it would insert "or specimens." Charles H. Carr, United
States Attorney for the Southern District of California thought the
phase "or constituting evidence in the proceeding" too broad as it
might in some case require the government to place all of its evidence before the defendant, thus permitting him to develop ingenious defenses. J. Edgar Hoover stated: "This is undesirable. It
would undoubtedly permit the defendants to examine signed statements obtained from co-conspirators. It would undoubtedly permit
the examination of technical laboratory reports, the worksheets of
an expert accountant, the worksheets of laboratory reports, all
physical evidence found at the scene of a crime or a weapon left
by the defendant at the scene of a crime. There is a possibility it
might include investigative notes made by investigators and which
they intend to use to refresh their memory. A further pertinent
question is, 'What if a signed statement is attached to and made a
part of a confidential report or a confidential file containing confidential information obtained from privileged and confidential sources
of information?"' Mr. Hoover believed the rule undesirable as it
corrects a limited and infrequent difficulty by conferring unnecessary benefits to the accused in every criminal trial. Preferable to
the proposed rule would be the following phraseology "documents
or tangible objects, obtained from the defendant and constituting
evidence in the proceeding, upon a showing .... ."Thus the rule
would be restricted to permitting inspection of data obtained from
the defendant when it is evidence. But even more preferable is
elimination of the entire rule. "A cure for such limited and infrequently occurring defects as now exists should be found in the code
of ethics and common sense of the attorneys representing the prose13
cution."
A committee of the State Bar of California "felt that an order
permitting the inspection of records, books and documents taken
from the possession of a defendant, and in the custody of the government, should not be discretionary but should be mandatory."
Don C. Miller, United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Ohio would require that defendant's motion be "reasonably made",
as the defendant might otherwise wait until a day or two before
trial. He would eliminate the language "or constituting evidence in
the proceeding." Harry C. Blanton, United States Attorney for the
'3

Id. at 44.
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Eastern District of Missouri, would also eliminate this language.
"These words are capable of such construction as will permit a
defendant to inspect the prosecutor's files and to examine statements
of witnesses and reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
which may contain such statements, which statements might, under
certain circumstances, become available as testimony in the case." 14
II. History of Drafting of Rule 17(C).
Rule 17 entitled "Subpoena" in its subsection (C) entitled
"For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects" provides:
"A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is
directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects
designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or
objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a
time prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and
may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents
or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and
their attorneys."
Rule 45 of the First Draft, dated September 8, 1941, entitled
"Subpoena" in its subsection (b) entitled "For Production of Documentary Evidence', was modeled word for word on Rule 45(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It provided: "A subpoena
may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce
the books, papers, or documents designated therein; but the court,
upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time
specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash
the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or (2) condition
denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing
the books, papers, or documents."
Rule 59(b) of the Second Draft, dated January 12, 1942, made
some changes. The language about advancement of the cost of
producing books was omitted. It was also provided: "The court in
its discretion may direct that books, papers or documents designated
in the subpoena shall be produced before the court at a time prior
to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production determine their admissibility
14

Id. at 45.
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in evidence and may permit such portions thereof as may be found
admissible to be inspected by the respective parties and their
attorneys."
Rule 57(b) of the third Draft, dated March 4, 1942, was identical with the Second Draft. Rule 24(b) of the Fourth Draft, dated
May 18, 1942 bore a new title, the title finally adopted in the present
Rule 17(c), namely, "For Production of Documentary Evidence
and of Objects." The last three words were new. But no other
changes were made. Rule 25(b) of the Fifth Draft, dated June
1942, made a number of changes. The second sentence now provided: "The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify
the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive."
The sentence dropped the words previously appearing after the
word "promptly", namely, "and in any event at or before the time
specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith." The third sentence omitted the words "determine their admissibility in evidence
and may permit such portions as may be found admissible to be inspected." As altered the third sentence now provided: "The court in
its discretion may direct that books, papers, documents, or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time
prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in
evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers,
documents, or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys". The Committee Note pointed out that Civil
Rule 45(b) makes no specific reference to subpoena for the production of objects, but the use of the subpoena duces tecum for this purpose is well established.' 5 The designation of the documents or
objects called for should be as specific as possible. A specification
which is broad and indefinite may be unreasonable or oppressive.' 6
The last sentence provides a method by which the court may permit
either side to inspect subpoenaed documents or objects under the
supervision of the court. It is inserted in the interest of fairness
and for the purpose of preventing delay during the trial, particularly
in cases where numerous documents may have been subpoenaed."'
This draft was submitted to the Supreme Court for comment by it.
15 See WicMORE, EViDENCE § 2200(a) (3d ed. 1940).
16 Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.

90 (1906).
17

Compare Prdjun v.United States, 237 Fed. 799 (6th Cir. 1916).
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No crlticism was offered by the Court. Rule 20(b) of the Sixth
8
Draft, dated Winter 1942-1948, made no changes.'
Rule 20 (b) of a draft, dated March 1948, known as "Preliminary
Draft", between the Sixth and Seventh Drafts, made no changes.
Rule 20(b) of the First Preliminary Draft, dated May 1948 (the
Seventh Committee draft) made no changes. Rule 19(c) of the
Second Preliminary Draft, dated February 1944 (the eighth committee draft) made no changes. Rule 19(c) of the Report of the
Advisory Committee, dated July 1944 (ninth draft) made no
changes. The Supreme Court made no change. Because two prior
proposed rules were rejected by the Court the rule became Rule
17(c).
Very few comments were made to the Advisory Committee on
this rule. With respect to the First Preliminary Draft (seventh
draft) there was but a single comment. Thomas J. Morrissey, United
States Attorney for the District of Colorado stated that "we are
opposed to complete disclosure."1 9 With respect to the Second
Preliminary Draft (eighth draft) there was also but a single comment. The Special Committee of the Los Angeles Bar Association
stated: "The committee recommends that subpoena duces tecum
should not be issued in blank, but that as a prerequisite to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, a showing of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the papers or
objects to be produced and the materiality and necessity therefor
and that they are in the possession of the party to whom the subpoena is addressed, should be required. In California by virtue of
C.C.P., section 1985, it is required that the application for subpoena
duces tecum shall be accompanied by an affidavit specifying the
exact matters or things desired to be produced and setting forth
in full detail the materiality thereof to the issues involved in the
case, and stating that the witness has the desired matters or things
in his possession or under his control." 20

18

The Committee Note pointed out that the production of books, papers,

and documents may be required independently of testimony. Essgee Company

of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 861, 372-874 (1911).
19 2 Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Received Concerning

the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 433 (1948).
20
4 id. at 48 (1944). '
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III. Discovery in England and on the Continent
An early English case denied discovery to a criminal defendant.2 1 But subsequent cases established the contrary a century
ago. 22 There may be inspection of a document where it is the subject or the substance of the indictment,23 and also if the object is
such a document or chattel as would require an investigation by
experts in order to bring the facts before the jury.2 4 On the other
hand the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination would
25
prevent inspection by the prosecution.
The defendant is given wide protection in England today. As
Kenny states: "Modem practice concedes to every accused the right
to know, before his trial, what evidence will be given against him.
Hence if anyone who was not produced before the committing justice is to be called as a witness, full information should be furnished
the accused, both as to his name and the evidence he will give. If
this has not been done, his evidence should not be pressed at the
trial if the accused objects.... The same principle applies to letters
or other documents. And every witness whose depositions have been
taken before examining magistrates must be made to attend ... at

the trial in order that, if the Crown do not call him, the prisoner
may be able to do so."2 6
How does American procedure compare with Continental procedure as to discovery and inspection? Justice Jackson has stated:
"The Soviet Delegation objected to our practice on the ground
that it is not fair to defendants. Under the Soviet system when an
indictment is filed every document and the statement of every witness which is expected to be used against the defendant must be
21Rex v. Holland, 4 D. & E. 692, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792). Likewise
under the early common law the courts professed a lack of power to order
production. See Anon., 8 Salk 363, 91 Eng. Rep. 875 (1702).
22Rex v. Harrie, 6 C. & P. 105, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1833); Regina v.
Spry and Dore, 3 Cox C.C. 221 (1848); Regina v. Colucci, 3 Fost. & F. 103,
176 Eng. Rep. 46 (1861).
23Rex v. Harrie, 6 C. & P. 105, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1833); Regina v.
Colucci,
3 Fost. & F. 103, 176 Eng. Rep. 46 (1861).
24
Regina v. Spry and Dore, 3 Cox C.C. 221 (1848).

25 Rex v. Purnell, 1 Win. B1. 37, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (1748).
26 KENNY, OUTLINES or CRUiNAL LAw 501 n.3 (Turner ed. 1952). See

also Lawson and Keedy, Criminal Procedures in England,

1 J. CnIM. L. &

CRUMNOLOGY 748, 749 (1911); ARcHBOLD, PLEADING, EvIDENcE & PRACrcE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 368, 444, 496-497 (32d ed. 1949); 6 WIGMOnE, EVIDENCE
394 (3d ed. 1940); State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647, 651 (1947);
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 895 (1953).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss3/2

12

Orfield: Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ified with the court and made known to the defense. It was objected
that under our system the accused does not know the statements of
accusing witnesses nor the documents that may be used against
him, that such evidence is first made known to him at the trial too
late to prepare a defense and, that this tends to make the trial something of a game instead of a real quest for guilt. It must be admitted
that there is a great deal of truth in this criticism. We reached a
compromise by which the Nurnberg indictment was more informative than English or American practice, but less so than in Soviet and
French practice."2 7 Thus there is automatic discovery on the Continent without any need for application for discovery by the defendant. On the other hand the European countries seem to have no
system of discovery before trial based on application of the parties
for discovery. In the United States "there are available discovery
and related techniques for probing the factual side of the controversy
unknown to French and German law. To the extent that discovery
and pre-trial procedures are used to define the matters at issue and
prevent surprise at the trial, other institutions and techniques serve
these functions in French and German law. Neither French nor
German law provides, however, any way in which a comparable
investigation of the factual issues in the litigation can be under28

taken."

IV. Discovery in Federal Criminal Procedure Prior to the Federal
CriminalRules
While it often is assumed that there was no discovery in the
federal courts before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure the cases reveal that discovery was sometimes granted.
In perhaps the first case on the subject Chief Justice Marshall, sitting
as a Circuit Justice, upheld a subpoena duces tecum, issued before
indictment and before arraignment.2 9 The defendant had applied
for a subpoena duces tecum, to compel the President to produce a
letter. The President did not comply but sent the demanded letter
to the United States Attorney who returned a copy of such parts of
2
7Bull Nurnberg Trial, 7 F.R.D. 175, 178 (1947).
See also Jackson,
Some Problems in Developing an International Legal System, 22 TxEn'. L.Q.

147, 150-151 (1948).
2
S von Mehren, The Judicial Process: A Comparative Analysis, 5 Am. J.

Comp.
L. 197, 224-225 (1956).
29
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). See the
discussion of this case in Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734, 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); Note, 18 U. Cmi. L. REv. 122, 124 (1950); Berger and Krash,
Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451, 1456-1460 (1950).
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the letter as he thought material. Chief Justice Marshall used
forceful language in describing the right to compulsory process, in
discussing the issuance of a subpoena, as to which there was no
hesitancy in the case at bar.30 He indicated that there was no absolute right. "If it be apparent that the papers are irrelative to the
case, or that for state reasons they cannot be introduced into the
defense, the subpoena duces tecum would be useless." 3 ' It should be
noted that the letter sought was not a letter written by the defendant,
but a letter written by the principal witness against him. The court
found the letter to be material to the defense.32 The original, and
not simply a copy, must be produced. 33
Apparently no decisions involving discovery were rendered in
reported decisions for more than a century following United States
v. Burr. A decision of the federal court for Puerto Rico in 1917
recognized that the protection furnished by inspection at the trial
is entirely inadequate, for sometimes the evidence, inspection of
which is sought, can be combatted only by extensive expert examination.3 4 On the particular facts discovery was denied. But the
court stated: "What control has the court over the evidence before
the evidence is offered? Has the court any right to make the government show its hand? The court undoubtedly has control over
all the proceedings in a case, and it may be that if there is a showing that the evidence in the possession of the government must be
exhibited to the defendant in order for him to properly prepare his
case the court would exercise the power.... It may very well be
that there is a power in the court to compel such production; there
are no cases cited, but it would seem that there must in a clear case
be such power in the court."35 In the instant case the defendant's
application was not under oath, and there was no showing of necessity. Hence the defendant was not permitted inspection of lottery
tickets to obtain the numbers on them. He was charged with bringing in lottery tickets. If inspection were allowed the defendant
might thereby win the lottery prizes. That is to say inspection
would enable the defendant to secure the fruits of his crime, Re30 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 83, 84, 85.
3125 Fed. Cas. 35.
32 25 Fed. Cas. 86.

33 25 Fed. Cas. 37.
34 United States v. Riera, 10 P.R. 186, 188 (1917). See comment on this
case in 41 HAv. L. REv. 519, 520 (1928); 1955 U. ILL. L. Fonum 158, 159.
35 10 P.R. 186, 188-189 (1917).
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freshing defendant's memory is not sufficient basis without more for
discovery.
In 1918 it was held that where in the course of an investigation
into a bankrupts affairs under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 the testimony of witnesses was taken stenographically before a referee, the
bankrupt was entitled to a copy of the testimony.30 The court
pointed out that the proceeding might result in contempt and criminal proceedings against the bankrupt. It made no difference that
the testimony could not be used in evidence against the bankrupt.
An Alaskan court issued an order allowing the defendant to
photograph before the trial a piece of glass alleged to bear his fingerprints. The court stated that it was "unable to see any ground
for refusing the application, except that there is no express statutory
provision for granting it, and no precedent."37 The court stated that
if the defendant were to ask for an outline of the entire case of the
government, such a demand would be unreasonable. Examination
of chattels was frequently allowed in civil actions in the United
States, Canada, and England. If discovery before trail were denied,
the trial itself would be slowed as the defendant could ask for a
continuance so that his expert witness could refute the government's
case.

A case frequently cited by opponents of discovery is United
States v. Garrson.8 8 But the case simply holds that a motion by a
defendant to inspect the minutes of the grand jury should be denied,
and District Judge Learned Hand condemned such motions in strong
language.
Where a subpoena was served on an assistant district attorney
of the state of New York requiring him to produce written statements of a codefendant made to him in his official capacity, it was
held that the statements need not be produced as they were privileged on general grounds of public policy because of their confidential nature.3 9 But the court did not assert that discovery was
not available in other cases.
30In re Greenbaum, 249 Fed. 468 (6th Cir. 1918). The court affirmed
the holding of the district court in 243 Fed. 965, 969 (E.D. Mich. 1917),
which cited two criminal cases allowing discovery on the basis that a public
recorded document was involved.
37
United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922). The court quoted
WiGmom, EvmEmCE § 1862.
38 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
39
Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946, 950 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

264 U.S. 595 (1924).
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The cases cited thus far have not opposed discovery in criminal
cases. But in 1932 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
threw out the first serious doubts as to its availability.40 The court
upheld the decision of the district court which denied discovery of
a written statement of a government witness. The court pointed
out that while a statute gave a right to discovery in civil cases the
statute could not be stretched to cover criminal cases, and even
if it could, the prerequisites for discovery were not present in the
instant case. The party demanding discovery is confined to documents necessary to the establishment of his own case, and may not
fish among the prosecution's papers. Thus, it was in fact unnecessary to say that discovery lay in no criminal case. Moreover under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure discovery is not granted
as to statements of government witnesses. Another decision of the
Second Circuit involved inspection at the trial and not prior to the
trial. The court stated: "Assuming that the accused has some
privilege to inspect documents in the possession of the prosecution
...

,

like a party to a civil action, he must show, at least presump-

tively, that they are material. He has no privilege to rummage at
will through the papers of the prosecution on the chance of turning
up something favorable; or to call for them seriatim during the trial
for the same purpose." 41
Where the defendant moved for return of all personal property
and papers taken from her, the motion was denied because based
on affidavits only.42 The court held that such a motion should be
supported by the testimony of witnesses.
A defendant charged with perjury on the basis of testimony
before a representative of the Securities and Exchange Commission
applied for an order directing that the defendant be furnished with
a copy of testimony taken at an investigation made by the commission through its representative. The federal district court denied
the application. 43 However, the court concluded that the copy
of the testimony would be of no help to the defendant in his trial
and that the defendant could have a fair trial without it. De40 United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub.
nor. Nachman v. United States, 286 U.S. 556 (1932). The only case cited by
the court was Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946, 950, which as has been
seen, laid down no broad rule against discovery.
41 United States v. Muraskin, 99 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1938). The court
cited two cases both of which involved inspection at the trial.
42 United States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp. 281, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
43 United States v. Mascuch, 30 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
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fendant hrgued that the court had "discretionary power" to grant
discovery. 44 The court did not deny that it had discretionary
power, but stated that there was no absolute right to discovery.
The burden of showing good reason for inspection is on the defendant and the government need not show disadvantage. 4 5
In the first Supreme Court decision to touch on discovery the court
did not reject the right to discovery in criminal cases.46 Defendant's
plea in bar alleged that the defendant appeared before an officer
of the Securities and Exchange Commission in response to a subpoena and after claiming immunity against self-incrimination testified concerning matters on which the prosecution was based. The
plea was accompanied by an application for production of a transcript of the testimony given by the defendant before the Commission. The Court held that the district court had erred in not
ordering production. But whether the complete transcript should
have been produced or only enough to show whether the testimony
of the defendant was a proper foundation for amnesty claimed, was
in the discretion of the district court. The Court stated: "This is
not an instance of the inspection of notes or material gathered by
the prosecution. What is sought is the production as evidence
in the hearing on the plea in bar of the very foundation of the
plea." 47 On the facts no need for secrecy was shown. It may be
noted that this was not a normal case of discovery before trial, but
48
rather of discovery at the hearing on the plea in bar.
A district court in a frequently cited case allowed discovery
as to impounded documents. 49 The defendant's motion for return
of the documents to the defendant was denied, but the government's motion to impound them in the clerk's office was allowed,
with a proviso that either party might examine them in the presence
of a deputy clerk or other representative of the government. The
prosecution was for conspiracy to violate the Anti-Trust Act.
44 Id. at 978.
45 See criticism

of this holding in Note, 38 J. Cani. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
249,255 (1947).
4
6 Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941).
47 Id. at 481. At the end of the first sentence quoted, the court in footnote
10 made the followving citations: "People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245
N.Y. 24; 156 N.E. 84; cf. Rex v. Holland, 4 T.R. (Durnford & East) 691."
48 On the difference between inspection at the trial and inspection before
trial see 45 CoLum. L. REv. 461, 465 (1945); United States v. Krulewitch,
145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944); Note, 98 U. PA. L. RPv. 719, 731 (1950).
49 United States v. B. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523, 534 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
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In a conspiracy proceeding where the federal agents ,did not
use their notes of occurrences, concerning which they testified, to
refresh their memory on the witness stand at either the preliminary
hearing or the trial, it was held that the defendants' motions for
inspection were properly denied on a motion to suppress evidence
obtained by such agents and also at the trial.5 0 Justice Roberts
stated: "The judge was clearly right in his ruling at the preliminary
hearing, as the petitioners should not have had access prior to trial,
to material constituting a substantial portion of the government's
case."5 1 The decision should not be construed as against all discovery, as cases after the adoption of the Federal Criminal Rules
would not allow discovery on the facts of this case.
In the last decision prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure it was held that the defendant was entitled
to inspection of the contents of a package alleged to have been sent
through the mails containing a threatening letter.52 The court
pointed out that prior decisions denying discovery involved fishing
expeditions. The modern trend was to allow inspection of writings
directly involved in the commission of the alleged crime, and also
of tangible objects. On the facts there was no danger of tampering
with witnesses or fabrication of evidence by the defendant. Refusal
of inspection would probably produce delays during the trial.
It seems a fair statement that the cases prior to the Federal
Rules did not reject discovery in criminal cases and that a considerable number of them allowed a rather liberal discovery. The
Federal Criminal Rules should be interpreted as based on the most
liberal reported cases. 58 As stated by the then First Assistant in the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, "The later cases
indicate rather strongly that the right to inspection does actually
exist, and . . . this rule does not create any new departure from
the old law."5 4 If the view be taken that these earlier cases resented narrow discovery, this does not necessarily preclude liberal
50 United States v. Goldman, 188 F.2d 310, 814 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 316
U.S. 129, 132 (1941).
51316 U.S. 132. The rule against inspection at the trial itself when the
memoranda are not used on the witness stand has been criticized. McCoNUacK,
EVIDENCE 17 (1954); The Alpha, 44 F. Supp. 807, 815 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
52 United States v. Warren, 53 F. Supp. 435 (D. Conn. 1944).
53 Note, 67 HAIv. L. REV. 492, 493 (1954).
54 McInerney, Proceedings Between Indictment and Trial, 5 F.R.D. 156,
161 (1945). That there was discretionary power to grant discovery, see Note,
53 Dicm. L. REV. 801, 305 (1949).
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discovery under Rule 16 for the Supreme Court has said that Rule 16
been allowed in criminal
"was a departure from what had .
55
cases."
V. Arguments For and Against Discovery
What are the arguments in favor of discovery before trial in
criminal cases? A criminal prosecution should not be treated like
a game.5 6 That is to say artificial barriers should not be erected
to make it difficult for a defendant to prove his innocence. It is the
duty of the government to give all possible protection to the innocent
as well as to punish the guilty.5 7 The defendant would have a better chance to clear himself. 58 The right exists in civil cases and
should therefore exist in criminal cases. 59 The element of surprise
at the trial with attendant delay and continuances is largely eliminated. 60 Perhaps the principal argument is that discovery is neces61
sary to help the defendant prepare his case.
What are the opposing arguments? There can be no corresponding right in the prosecution because of the doctrine of selfincrimination. 62 But this is offset in many cases by handicaps of the
defendant such as low intelligence, lack of funds, inadequate counsel and no comparable service to match the well-equipped modem
crime laboratory. 68 Furthermore, in some states the defendant must
Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 841 U.S. 214 (1951).
55
6

5 Onrnmm, CmmAL PROcEDUE FRom ARPEST TO APPEAL 821-823

(1987); State v. Tune, 17 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 894-895 (1953), dissent by

Brennan, J.; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951).
57 United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1944); State v.
Tune, 17 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 895 (1953), dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.
Canon 5 of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association provides: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting
of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible."

58 United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922).

59 State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 819, 296 S.W. 182, 135 (1927); State v.
Tune, 17 N.J. 208, 98 A.2d 881, 894, 896 (1953); Note 64 HAIv. L. REv.
1011,601012 (1951).
ORFLD, CamuNAL PROCEDURE FRoM ARmEST TO APPEAL 321-323. See

the view of Chief Judge Charles E. Clark, A Modern Procedure for New York,
NEW Yosuc STATE BAR ASS'N,

REPORT OF PROcEEDINCS

OF 78Tn ANNUAL

MEETING 51, at 54-55 (1955), cited in United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394,
406 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
61 60 YALE L.J. 626, 637 (1951).
62 See State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424-425, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910);
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884-885 (1953); United States v.
Garsson, 291 F.ed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.) 1923).
63 Note, 60 YALE L;J. 626, 635 (1951).
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give notice of alibi or insanity, and must reveal the names of witnesses. A corporate defendant may be unable to plead self-incrimination. The required records rule may also preclude such a plea.
4
The privilege could easily be abused by fishing expeditions.6
But safeguards may be developed such as requiring the defendant
to designate specifically the papers he seeks, to show that they are
material and necessary to the proper preparation of his defense, etc.
Rules 16 and 17(c) themselves contain various limitations, and the
decisions construing them have developed further safeguards. Since
the rules use the word "may" the trial court has considerable discretion to refuse discovery.

It has been argued that the defendant can be granted enough
time for inspection during the trial.6 5 But cross-examination, impeachment and rebuttal depend on careful investigation and preparation. Continuances during the trial are not adequate. A subsequent motion for new trial on the ground of surprise is rarely
granted. The growing intricacy of issues in criminal trials necessitates elaborate investigation and research before trial.66
It is also asserted that perjury will be facilitated and encouraged.6 7 But as Wigmore points out this contention has previously
been discredited in other fields.68 The knowledge obtained by the
defendant will not seriously reduce the probative force of the evidence if the theory of the prosecution is correct.6 9 It is also asserted
that there would be interference with witnesses. 70 But perjury and
tampering with witnesses may occur almost as easily under a system not permitting discovery. 7 ' The guilty defendant, necessarily
acquainted with the details of the crime, can fabricate a defense
64

Padgett v. State, 64 Fla. 689 59 So. 946, 949 (1912); State v. Tune,

13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 885-886 (1953).
65 Commonwealth v. Twitehell, 1 Brewster 551 (Pa. 1868).
66

ORFIELD, CRmIMNAL PROCEDUE FROm ARRE s

TO APPEAL

830; State

v. Tune, 17 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 897-898 (1953), dissenting opinion of
Brennan, J.
67 See Commonwealth v. Mead, 78 Mass.
State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 423-424, 91
v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
686 Wim oRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1859, 1863
dissenting opinion of Brennan, J., in State v.
881, 894.
69
70

(12 Cray) 167, 170 (1858);
N.E. 186, 192 (1910); State
(3d ed. 1940). See also the
Tune, 17 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d

ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROm ARREST TO APPEAL 330.

Commonwealth v. Mead, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 167, 170 (1858); State
v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
71 Note, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 633-634 (1951).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss3/2

20

Orfield: Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
accordingly. In most states the defendant is already furnished with
a list of prosecution witnesses, with whom he can tamper as he
pleases. If the discovery involves tangible evidence such as documents or inanimate objects, tampering is difficult.72
VI. Discovery Under Rule 16 as Interpreted by the Courts.
Enough time has elapsed since the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946 so that there have been many
decisions and law review comments on the meaning of Rule 16.73
Much attention has been given to the scope of discovery.
A motion for inspection made during the trial is not governed
by Rule 16, as Rule 16 deals with discovery before trial.74 Discovery
during trial is not governed by any of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or by any statute. It has been dealt with by judicial
decisions. The principles that apply are different though many state
court decisions fail to differentiate between the two.
To be distinguished from discovery under Rule 16 is application
for inspection of the minutes of the grand jury which is governed
by Rule 6(e). 75 Likewise to be distinguished is application for a
bill of particulars under Rule 7(f).7 6 Likewise to be distinguished
77
is application for a list of prosecution witnesses.
Unlike Rule 17(c), Rule 16 clearly provides that it is only the
defendant who may apply for discovery and inspection. The court
may order discovery "upon motion of a defendant." To allow discovery against the defendant would seem to violate his privilege
72 OxnurE,
73

CRnvnNAL PnRoCauRE

FROM ARREST To APPEAL

333.

The author has also examined all of the approxinately 165 state court

decisions on discovery in criminal cases. They furnish many useful analogies

and approaches.
74

Simmons v. United States, 220 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also

United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 156 A.L.R. 337 (1944), 45 COLUM.
L. REv.561 (1945).
75 See ORFIELD, CRIIVNAL PROcEDuRE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL, 169-172;
Note, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 629-630 (1951); Note, 57 COLuM. L. REv. 135

(1957).
76 OFELD, CRIMuNAL PROcEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 238-247.

In some state court decisions a bill for particulars has been sought to secure
inspection. State v. Lowery, 160 La. 811, 107 So. 583 (1926).
77

ORFELD, CrmiNAL PROCEDURE FRoM

ARREST TO APPEAL 278-279;

Note, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 631 (1951); Note, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 113 (1954).
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against self-incrimination. 78 May the government have discovery
proceedings against a criminal defendant through Federal Criminal
Rule 28 providing for expert witnesses? It has been suggested that
appointment of an accountant to serve as an expert witness in a
prosecution for income tax evasion might violate the constitutional
79
provision against self-incrimination.
Does the defendant have a constitutional right to discovery
before trial? For example is denial of discovery a violation of due
process as provided for in the Fifth Amendment? On the basis of
the state court decisions the answer would seem to be in the negative.80 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari where discovery
was refused in Louisiana, 8 ' New Jersey, 82 Texas, 83 and Washington. 84 In a case coming up from the Supreme Court of Oregon the
United States Supreme Court held that due process under the fourteenth amendment does not require discovery.85 But in a recent
decision of the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit there is a
suggestion that some cases of denial of inspection of a defendant's
confession may violate due process. 88
One of the most litigated questions has been whether or not
the defendant is entitled to inspection of his statements made to the
police or to agents of the government. There have been about fifteen
78 See Notes, 1 VxND. L. REv. 626 (1948); 10 VAu. L. Rzv. 147 (1956);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Application of Daniels,
140 F.Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See also Fisher v. State, 140 Neb. 216, 299 N.W. 501, 508 (1941);
People v. Gatti, 167 Misc. 545, 4 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Ct. of General Sessions
New York County 1938); State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E.2d 186,
192 (1910).
79 United States v. Brodson, 136 F.Supp. 158, 166 (E.D.Wisc. 1955),
25 FoanHmm L. REv. 389, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1499, 44 Ky. L.J. 1499. This
case was reversed on appeal in a two to one decision chiefly on the ground that
dismissal was premature, 43 A.B.A.J. 65 (1957).
80 State v. Cala, 35 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1940).
81 State v. Matteo, 212 La. 284, 31 So. 2d 801, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818
(1947); State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
846 (1952).
82State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568 (1951), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 925 (1955).
83 Lopez v. State, 255 S.W.2d 701, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
84 State v. Clark, 21 Wn. 2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S.
878 (1945).
85
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952).
86 Application of Tune, 230 F.2d 883, 888, 892 (3d Cir. 1956), 47
J. Cnim. L. 350 (1956). A habeas corpus proceeding by a state court defendant was involved. On the facts no want of due process was found as
prejudice was not shown.
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decisions and they have been fairly evenly divided whether in the
district courts or in the courts of appeals. The first case construing
Rule 16 denied discovery of statements made by the defendant to
government agents. 87 Rule 16 was construed as embracing only
those documents and objects which were in existence and in the
custody of a defendant or other person prior to the government's
obtainment of them by process or seizure. 88 The second case held
that statements of the defendant after his arrest obviously were
not material taken from him or belonging to him.89
In the third case the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the defendant was not entitled to be furnished with a
copy of his confession. 90 But the court suggested that as a matter
of "fundamental fairness" the defendant should have a right to a
copy.91 Even if there were a right; however, it would be merely a
discretionary right. And the court stated that it did not intend to
imply that there were not some situations in which inspection would
be permitted as an inherent power of the court even though there
were no statute or rule of court.92 A confession is not something
appropriated from the defendant, nor did it "belong" to him. 93 The
fourth case which arose in the Southern District of New York and
in which defendant requested all confessions and "all statements in
writing or transcripts of testimony by defendants", held that the
defendant could not have discovery under Rule 16, Judge Edward
J. Dimock writing the opinion.94 The fifth case which arose in the
District of Columbia, decided by Judge Bolitha J. Laws, also denied
discovery of a defendant's statements or confessions made to the
police.95 The court pointed out that while cases in the District of
s7 United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
88 Id. at 271.
89 United States v. Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365, 366 (D. Mass. 1947), aff'd,
171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). The
problem was discussed only by the district court. For criticism of the view
that the defendant does not "obtain" see Note, 67 Hawv. L. REv. 492, 493
(1954).
90Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 843, 11 A.L.R.2d 635 (8th
Cir. 1949). This has been the view of most state court decisions. 52 A.L.R.
211,212 (1928).
91 174 F.2d 844.
92 175 F.2d 845.
93 175 F.2d 844.
94 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In United
States v. Reese, 11 F.R.D. 424, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1951), inspection of defendant's
statement was permitted without objection by the government.
95 United States v. Pete, 111 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1953).
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Columbia had permitted such discovery a showing of necessity in
the interest of justice had been made in such cases, while none was
made in the present case.9 6 In the sixth case, a decision of the
Northern District of New York by Judge Stephen W. Brennan
denied inspection of a statement given by the defendant to a gov97
ernment agent.
But in the seventh decision discovery was permitted by Judge
Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York to a defendant who
was a postal employee charged with conversion, of a written statement given by him to post office inspectors following questioning
at or about the time of his arrest.9 8 Such a statement was "obtained"
from him under the rule.9 9 The court did not accept the argument
that a defendant will commit perjury as to his prior statement. Moreover cross-examination would protect the government. And sanctions exist for perjury. In fact the government ought to give the
defendant a copy of the statement at the time he signs it. The court
pointed out that an earlier holding against discovery of confessions
was not unqualified. 100
In the eighth decision the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied discovery of statements signed by the defendant, which were
used as a partial basis for a confession dictated by an F.B.I. agent
and signed by the defendant, such confession being introduced in
evidence by the government. 10 1 It was not a document in the custody of the defendant at the time the government acquired possession of it. In the ninth decision Judge Sidney Sugarman of the
Southern District of New York granted inspection of a statement
102
voluntarily made to an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
He pointed out that the statement was "obtained from" the defendant and that the statement was "material to the preparation of the
defense" and that the request was reasonable.' 03
96 Id. at 293. The court cited 4 BARRON & HOL'IZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
& PaOCEDURE § 2032, p. 126, n.8. See also Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the
Rules After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 167 n.10 (1954); Monroe
v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
97 United States v. Martel, 17 F.R.D. 326, 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
98 United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
99 Id. at 424. The court pointed out that there were decisions holding
that Rule 17(c) applied rather than Rule 16.
100 The court referred to Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 844-845
(8th Cir. 1949).
101 Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1955).
102 United States v. Klein, 18 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
103 Id. at 440. He cited United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
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In the tenth decision Judge Herlands, also of the Southern District denied the right to inspect and copy the transcript of a statement given by the defendant to an Assistant United States Attorney. 10 4 In a carefully written decision he spelled out his reasons.
Discovery did not lie at common law. 105 The drafting process of the
06
Advisory Committee showed a constant narrowing of the rule.'
Some of the members of the Advisory Committee thought that
Rule 16 was directed to cases where many documents had been
seized or impounded by the government and where defendant
needed such documents to prepare his defense. All the prior deci07
sions but one construing Rule 16 indicated that no discovery lay.'
Even if inspection lay of an oral statement made by the defendant to
a government representative, defendant had failed to show materiality and reasonableness. 108 Even if the oral statement is transcribed and signed or initialed or verified by the defendant it was
not obtained from the defendant and never belonged to the defendant. 10 9 If a wider rule is to be laid down it should be by action
of the Supreme Court through formal amendment of Rule 16.110
The trial judge must not apply his personal or subjective estimate
of value. In the eleventh decision by District Judge Thomas F.
Murphy, also of the Southern District of New York, discovery was
denied of the defendant's statement taken by the Internal Revenue
Bureau."' In the twelfth decision by District Judge Irving Kaufman, also of the Southern District, the court denied inspection of a
statement made by the defendant after his arrest while he was in
custody." 2 In the thirteenth decision, also by Judge Kaufman,
inspection was denied of an unsigned question, and answer statement given by the defendant to an agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue."13 But in the fourteenth decision another judge of the
Southern District of New York, Archie Owen Dawson, granted
inspection and the right to copy a statement signed by the defend104 United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) noted 80
TEmp. L.Q. 203 (1957), 45 GEo. L.J. 806 (1957).
105 18 F.R.D. 894, 396.
106 Id. at 397-898.
107 Id. at 898-403. The one contrary case was said to be United States

v. Klein, 18 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court cited as in accord
4 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 125-126.
108 18 F.R.D. 403.
109 Id. at 408-404.
110 Id. at 407.

a11 United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
112 United States v. Louie Gim Hall, 18 F.R.D. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
113 United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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ant and given to an F.B.I. agent after defendant's arrest and before
his arraignment. 114 The statement "belonged" to the defendant." 5 If the defendant had been properly apprised of his rights
it is doubtful that he would have turned over the statement without retaining a copy for himself. "Fairness" requires that the defendant have a right to discovery. In the fifteenth decision District Judge
Sylvester Ryan of the Southern District of New York granted inspection to a corporation and its officers of their own statements and
statements of their chief accountant made in the course of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, but not statements
made to the Internal Revenue Service or the F.B.I. 116 The court
pointed out that the statements were lengthy and detailed and
intricate; they were relevant and evidentiary; and delay at the trial
would be avoided.
Should a distinction be taken between a transcript of oral answers made by a defendant after his arrest on the one hand, and a
signed statement of the defendant taken after his arrest? One case
has said that discovery lies as to the latter as the document belonged
to the defendant just as much as if the document had been prepared
117
and signed before the arrest.
Are recordings of conversations between a defendant and a
police officer on any different basis than a written statement by the
defendant? A single case has held that it is doubtful that discovery
lies." 8 Such recordings were treated as analogous to a defendant's
confession.
To summarize a narrow view of discovery of statements of the
defendant to the police or to a government representative has been
taken in the federal district courts of the Southern District of Indiana, of Massachusetts, the Northern District of New York, Judges
Dimock, Herlands, Kaufman and Murphy of the Southern District
of New York, and by the Courts of Appeals of the Fifth and Eighth
114 United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
115 Id. at 93.
116 United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
117 United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In United
States v. Feltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), discovery was denied
as to an oral statement of the defendant. The court regarded as immaterial
the fact that when transcribed, the statement was not signed by the defendant.
The signing is only an additional item of evidence adding to the probative
value of the statement as an admission. See Note, 67 HAIv. L. Rv. 492,
494 (1954).
118 Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss3/2

26

Orfield: Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Circuits. But a broader view has been taken by the Federal District
courts of the District of Columbia, and by Judges Dawson, Ryan,
Sugarman and Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York.
There is dictum in the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit supporting broad discovery. On principle there should be allowance of
discovery in those cases as there was no clear expression by the
Advisory Committee to exclude confessions or statements of the
defendant from the operation of the rule.119
What about discovery as to other papers or objects obtained
from or belonging to the defendant? In the first case granting discovery it was held that a defendant charged with income tax evasion
was entitled to discovery of figures, bills, work sheets and other
tangible property in possession of the government which belonged
to the defendant and which had been seized by the government
from actual possession of the defendant. 120 The order was limited
to material actually taken from the possession of the defendant. A
defendant may have inspection of such things as were taken from
121
him at the time of arrest.
Inspection of diaries kept by the defendant has been permitted
as to his personal entries. 12 2 Any error committed was corrected
when inspection of the diaries as a whole were permitted at the trial.
The phrase "by seizure or by process" was construed by a district court as being a limitation on the material subject to inspection
whether it was obtained from the defendant or from others. 123 That
is to say that phrase qualifies the objects taken from a defendant as
well as from others. But subsequently a Court of Appeals thought
it probably improper to view the phrase as a qualification of the
language "obtained from or belonging to the defendant."124 This
view was also taken in a comprehensive opinion of District Judge
Herlands of the Southern District of New York. 125 In the first place,
110 Note, 67 HAIIv. L.

REv. 492, 494 (1954).

United States v. Rainey, 10 F.R.D. 431 (W.D.Mo. 1950). Defendant
was permitted, through his counsel, to inspect the paper or objects seized
and to photograph them.
121 United Sattes v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Hawaii 1952).
120

Discovery granted. See also United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820,
833 (D. Conn. 1955), where the government agreed to allow inspection and
copying.
122 United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1951).
123 United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946). See also
United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 183 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
124 Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 1949).
125 United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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as a matter of grammatical construction the words "by seizure or by
process" modify and restrict only the words "obtained from others."
In the second place, the phrase "or obtained from others by seizure
or by process" was inserted as a complete phrase for the first time
in the final draft of Rule 16. The draft just preceding already contained the antecedent phrase "obtained from or belonging to the
defendant." The phrase "or obtained from others by seizure or by
process" as a complete phraseological unit was substituted for the
phrase "or constituting evidence in the proceedings." Thus the
phrase modifies and restricts only the words "obtained from others."
What about the defendant's right to discovery with respect to
statements of other persons and statements of witnesses? In the first
case on the subject the defendant was denied inspection of statements of other persons made to government agents. 126 Such statements were not in existence and in the custody of the defendant or
other person prior to the government's obtainment of them by
127
process or by seizure.
A defendant is not entitled to discovery of a statement made by
a co-defendant to the grand jury. 128 The statement does not fall
into the category of a document taken from the defendant or seized
in the hands of someone else. 129 Discovery does not lie under
Rule 16 as to all statements in writing or transcripts of testimony
130
by any witness relative to an indictment.
A defendant is not entitled to inspection under Rule 16 of a
written statement by his co-defendant who had previously pleaded
guilty and was a potential witness against the defendant.13 ' Where
a corporation and its officers were prosecuted for misstatements of
corporate federal taxes in annual reports filed with the Stock Exchange, it was held that they are not entitled to inspect statements
made by thirteen co-conspirators to the Internal Revenue division
and the F.B.I. 132 Such co-conspirators were merely potential witnesses for the prosecution, and would not necessarily testify. If
they did testify, there might be inspection at the trial.
126 United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
127 Id. at 271. It is concluded that F.B.I. reports are not subject to
discovery under Rule 16 in Note, 67 HAnv. L. REv. 492, 494 (1954).
128 United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 706 (W.D. La. 1949).

129 Id. at 707-708. See note, 67 HAMv. L. RPv. 492, 494 (1954).
130 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
131 United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Rule
17(c) was held to apply rather than Rule 16.
132 United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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Inspection of statements made by government agents relating
to the defendant and procured from several persons will not be
permitted. 133 Where the government through the Internal Revenue
Service took statements from the defendants and his employees,
discovery would not be allowed as to the statements of the
34
employees.'
A motion asking for discovery, of all materials presented to the
grand jury, or which are to be offered at the trial, and the names
of all government witnesses who testified before the grand jury will
not be granted. 35 Such a motion amounts to embarking upon "a
broad fishing expedition."
In a prosecution for unlawfully attempting to bring an alien
into the United States, a motion to examine a suitcase containing
belongings of the alien was denied as the suitcase was not owned by
the defendant. 3 6 An affidavit of the alien showed the contents so
that inspection was not justified.
A selective service registrant who requested a resume of adverse
evidence in an F.B.I. report would be permitted to inspect and copy
minutes of a hearing which he claimed would disclose that he was
not given a fair resume of the adverse evidence contained in the
F.B.I. report used by the hearing officer, but he would not be per137
mitted to inspect the F.B.I. report itself.
Suppose the defendant seeks an order requiring the prosecution witnesses to submit to an interview before trial. Rule 16 makes
139
no provision for this. 138 State court decisions have denied relief.
Suppose the defendant wishes to obtain a physical examination
of the prosecuting witness in a rape case. There is no criminal rule
corresponding to Civil Rule 35.140 In a number of state court deci133

United States v. Martel, 17 F.R.D. 326, 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).

United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
135
United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 183 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
136 United States v. Martel, 17 F.R.D. 826, 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
'34

137 United States v. Wider, 117 F. Supp. 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). The
Supreme Court had held that there is no right to inspect the F.B.I. report
in such cases. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S 1 5 (1953). Three justices
dissented. See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HAv.
L. REv. 193, 243-248 (1956).
138 Note, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 642-644 (1951).
139 People v. Duncan, 261 IIl. 339, 103 N.J. 1043, 1045 (1913); Leahy
v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 570, 13 S.W.2d 874, 881 (1929).

140 See Note, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 644-645 (1951).
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sions a physical examination has been granted,1 4 1 while in other
142
cases it has been denied.
Suppose the defendant wishes to inspect the results of government conducted tests and experiments. There seem to be no cases
of this under Rule 16, although there are a number of state court
14 3
cases granting discovery.
Suppose what is sought by the defendant is the work product
of the United States Attorney. Professor McCormick points out that
there is "an-unwillingness to require the prosecuting attorney to disclose in advance of trial his own memoranda and the statements
taken from witnesses constituting his work as lawyer in preparation
for trial." 1 44 There may be question as to what is the work product.
The defendant's confession is not a work product.' 45 It has been
held in New Jersey that the files of a former prosecutor are not the
work product of the present prosecutor. 146 It is true that Hickman v.
Taylor147 gave considerable protection to the work product of the
lawyer. But in cases of necessity such work product may be subject
to discovery.

148

Suppose a case in which discovery and inspection are granted.
Does this entitle the defendant to a further order directing the government to aid him to identify handwriting on the papers or authorship thereof? It was held not as Rule 16 corresponds to Civil Rule 34
only and not to Civil Rule 26 providing for taking depositions of
141 Walker v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 179, 153 Pac. 209 (1915); People v.
Preston, 19 Cal. App. 175, 127 Pac. 660 (1912); State v. Pucca, 4 Pennewill
71 (Del.
1902).
142 McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, 7 So. 35, 16 Am. St. Rep. 25 (1889);
State v. Allen, 128 Wash. 217, 222 Pac. 502, 503 (1924), 22 MicH. L. REV.
740 (1924).
143 See Note, 41 J. CIm. L. 64 (1950).
14 4
McCoRmucK, EVIDENCE 210 (1954). See State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio
St. 397, 91 N.E. 186, 188, 27 L.R.A. n.8, 558, 18 Ann. Cas. 115 (1910).
It is said that Rule 16 does not cover the 'work product" of the government
in Note, 67 HAnv. L. REv. 492, 494 (1954).
145 Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 845, 11 A.L.R.2d 635 (8th
Cir. 1949); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 886, 895, 897-898 (1953).
In State v. Bunk, 63 A.2d 842, 845 (N.J. 1949), the work product was thought
to consist of confessions, investigative reports, and statements of witnesses.
146 State v. Winne, 27 N.J. Super. 120, 98 A.2d 898, 900 (1953), a/I'd,
27 N.J. Super. 304, 99 A.2d 368, 370 (1953).
147 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
148 Note, 42 J. CuvM. L. 774, 777-778 (1952); Taine, Discovery of Trial
Preparationsin the Federal Courts, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 1026, 1033 (1950);
Note, 62 HAav. L. REv. 269, 274 (1948).
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the opposing party nor to9 Civil Rule 33 providing for interrogatories
14
to the opposing party.
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "It
is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appear reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." There is no similar
provision in Criminal Rule 16, and the decisions on Rule 16 have
50
not followed the liberal Civil Rule.1
To obtain inspection the defendant must show that the documents or records sought were obtained from, or belonged to, the
151
defendant, or were taken from others by seizure or by process.
Recordings of broadcasts procured from the Russians after the collapse of Germany were not seized nor obtained by process from the
Russians. 152 It has been held that the evidence sought must con153
sist of tangible objects such as books; papers, documents, etc.
Where the defendant seeks inspection of papers of his own or of
others which have never been in possession of the government,
54
discovery will be denied.'
Furthermore, the defendant must show (a) that the items
sought may be material to the defense, and (b) that the request is
reasonable. 155 One court required that the defendant show "good
cause", but possibly it was simply restating this rule. 156 Civil Rule 34
requires good cause, but Criminal Rule 16 does not mention it. It
has been held that a request is not reasonable when the defendant
149 United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1 0 Note, 42 J. CnRm. L., C. & P. S. 774, 775 (1952; Note, 67 HAnv. L.

RE:v. 492, 495-496 (1954).
151 United States v. Rosenberg, 10 F.R.D. 521, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
The moving papers of the defendant should contain such allegations. See
also United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 185 F.2d 150, 162 (7th Cir. 1950);
United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 368 (D.D.C. 1954).

152 United States v. Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (D. Mass. 1947).
153 United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 183 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
154 United States v. Long, 15 F.R D 25 26 (D. Puerto Rico 1953);
United States v. Kaskel, 18 F.R.D. 477, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
155 United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 185 F.2d 159, 162 (7th Cir.
1950); United States v. Klock, 100 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D.N.Y.

1951);

United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 183 (W.D. Pa. 1952); United
States v. Kidwell, 14 F.R.D. 399 (W.D. Mo. 1953); United States v. Cohen,
15 F.R.D. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367,
368 (D.D.C. 1954); United States v. Brandt, 189 F. Supp. 367, 370 (N.D.
Ohio 1955); United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But
see United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512, 515 (S.D. -Tex. 1955).
1 156 United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D. Cal." 1954). Seb
also United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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fails to enumerate records which he has inspected and copied pre157
viously.
The defendant must be careful not to make a motion which is
too indefinite or too comprehensive.' 58 The defendant's motion for
discovery must designate the items sought to be produced. 159 A
request for all the books, papers, documents, and tangible objects
taken from the defendant, would be specific enough. 160 Where the
action of the government has been such that the defendant is unable
to designate, he may be excused from designating. 161
The mere fact that defendant lacks funds to pay for an independent investigation does not expand the rule to embrace material
not comprehended by it.162 It has been suggested that in a criminal
antitrust prosecution there should be broader discovery than in the
normal case as in a civil antitrust case the right to discovery is
broad. 163
Inspection has been granted as to requests to which the government did not object. Thus inspection was permitted as to birth certificates of the defendant obtained by the government. 164 Likewise
inspection of defendant's statement to a postal inspector was permitted when the government did not object. 165 In one case the court
refused to grant the defendant's motion for inspection, but suggested
that the parties agree on a time and place for inspection by defendant's counsel of documents in possession of the United States. 166 In
such a case if the defendant is dissatisfied with the materials shown
him, he should return to the court with a request for a formal order.
The court on denying a motion for inspection may suggest agreeUnited States v. Giglio, 17 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
United States v. Klock, 100 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 1951).
159 United States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). United
States v. Brandt, 139 F. Supp. 367, 370 (N.D. Ohio 1955). But see United
States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512, 515 (C.D. Tex. 1955).
160 United States v. Kidwell, 14 F.R.D. 399 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
161 United States v. Lipshitz, 18 F.R.D. 102, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). The
government had prepared a list of accounts receivable from the defendant's
books and records without his knowledge or consent.
162 United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
163 Note, 64 HAzy. L. REv. 1011, 1013 (1951), citing United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. Mass. 1950).
164 United States v. Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
165 United States v. Reese, 11 F.R.D. 424, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
166 Webb v. United States, 191 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1951). Sec
also United States v. Klock, 100 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 1951); United
States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 833 (D. Conn. 1955).
'57

158
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ment by the parties without prejudice to a renewal of the motion
167
if the parties do not come to an agreement.

A basis for denying discovery is that discovery would be dangerous to national defense. Discovery was therefore denied of a
sketch classified by the Atomic Energy Commission as top secret. 168
Discovery should not be allowed where it involves public disclosure
of the very information it is alleged defendants conspired to trans170
169
State secrets should be protected.
mit to a foreign government.

Granting of a motion for discovery and inspection "is in terms
discretionary and not mandatory." 17 1 This of course does not mean
that the trial court should always be upheld in its denial of discovery. As Chief Justice Marshall said in the earliest case on discovery:
"But a motion to its discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but

to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal
principles." 172 The granting of a new trial is discretionary, yet
many cases have been reversed where the denial was an abuse of
173
discretion.

A number of the members of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have expressed their views on
the meaning of Federal Criminal Rule 16 and on the desirability of a
broad right to discovery. But only about six members have done so,
and their views are divided.' 7 4 Thus, a broad construction is not

precluded. 175
107

United States v. Klock, 100 F. Supp. 280, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 1951).

168 United States v. Rosenberg, 10 F.R.D. 521, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).

The government furnished an affidavit to that effect.
169 Id. at 524. It has been pointed out that whereas Federal Civil Rule
84 specifically excepts privileged documents from discovery, there is no corresponding exception in Federal Criminal Rule 16. Note, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1188, 1191 n.20 (1953).
170 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 80, 87 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
171 United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1951). See also
United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v.
Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
172 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 80, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
173 United States v. Smith, 156 F.2d 642, 646 (3d Cir. 1946); Finnegan
v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 115 (8th Cir. 1953).
174The Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Arthur T. Vanderbilt seems
opposed to wide discovery. See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 So. 2d 881
(1953). The Secretary of the Committee, Alexander Holtzoff, has taken a
liberal position. Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years of
Footnote continued on next page.
175 Note, 67 HAav.L. REv. 492, 494 (1954).
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In the only Supreme Court decision construing Rule 16 Justice
Minton stated for the Court: "It was intended by the rules to give
some measure of discovery. Rule 16 was adopted for that purpose.
It gave discovery as to documents and other materials otherwise
beyond the reach of the defendant which, as in the instant case,
might be numerous and difficult to identify. The rule was to apply
not only to documents and other materials belonging to the defendant, but also to those belonging to others which had been obtained
by seizure or process. This was a departure from what had therefore been allowed in criminal cases.
• "Rule 16 deals with documents and other materials that are in
the possession of the Government and provides how they may be
made available. In the interest of orderly procedure in the handling
of books, papers, documents and objects in the custody of the Government accumulated in the course of an investigation and subpoenaed for use before the grand jury and on the trial, it was provided by Rule 16 that the court could order such materials made
available to the defendant for inspection and copying or photographing. In that way, the control and possession of the Government is not disturbed. Rule 16 provides the only way the defendant
17 6
can reach such materials so as to inform himself."
It has been pointed out that the applicability of Rule 16 was
not before the court in the Bowman case as the government bad
allowed inspection under Rule 16, but challenged the subpoena
177
under Rule 17(c).
In a case involving inspection at the trial the Supreme Court
pointed out that Federal Criminal Rule 16 is narrower than Federal
Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 167 n.10 (1954); compare his decision in United States
v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 368 (D.D.C. 1954). Professor George H. Dession
favored broad discovery although conceding that Rule 16 as worded seems
to call for rather narrow discovery. Dession, The New Federal Rules of
Criminal ProcedureII, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 218-220 (1947). George H. Medalic
favored broad discovery. Medalie, FederalRules of Criminal Procedure,4 LAW.
GUmD REv., no. 3, p. 1 at p. 8 (1944). Professor Lester B. Orfield favored
broad discovery. OnFoL9, CGarNAL PnocE
EruFROM A uS TO APPEAL
321-323, 328-334 (1947); Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,24 NoTuE DAmm LAwYm 315, 337-339 (1949). Aaron Youngquist
has not precluded a liberal interpretation though he stresses the case of impounded documents. 6 Nsw YoPR UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAw INsTrruTE PnocEretNGS 166-167 (1946). See also United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394,
398, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
176 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 218-219 (1951).
177 United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Note,
64 HAnv. L. REv. 1011 (1951).
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Civil Rule 34.178 But upholding a liberal right to inspection at trial
the court quoted with approval Judge Cooley's statement: "The
State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of
the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the
79
testimony of untrustworthy persons."'
Although several of the decisions of federal courts of the Second
Circuit have construed Rule 16 rather narrowly, 8 0 the latest decision
of the Court of Appeals has gone in the opposite direction. "To the
defendant seeking to prepare a defense to a net worth criminal
prosecution it is no answer to say that he should have kept better
records, or that his memory should have been better. Of course, the
defendant must not be allowed to rummage around freely in the
Government's files or working papers, or avoid the burdensome
chore of preparing for trial; but where he genuinely lacks knowledge, he should not be denied information relevant to his defense
by a restrictive interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure."'81 It would seem desirable to have the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia sit en banc
to get a clear ruling on Rules 16 and 17(c).
At what time must the motion for discovery be made? Rule 16
provides that it may be made "at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information." 8 2 Thus, there is no right to discovery
prior to indictment as for use by the defendant in the grand jury
3
proceeding. i8
Unjustified delay in asking for discovery may warrant a denial
thereof. For example where accountants representing a person
178 Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 419 n.9 (1953). Federal
district Judge Freed has stated: "I am inclined to the conviction that if steps
shall be taken to extend the discovery rules now found in civil procedure to
criminal cases as well, enforcement of the criminal law would not suffer."
The Rules of Criminal Procedure: An Appraisal Based on a Year's Experience, 83 A.B.AJ. 1010, 1068 (1947).
1t79
People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (1884).
180 United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1956).

Un-

happily the statement is dictum as the court expressly stated that it did not

have to pass on the issue, and that it reversed on other grounds.
181 Western Pacific Railroad Case, 345 U.S.

247 (1953); 52 MicH.

L. REv. 614 (1954); 5 STAN. L. llv. 332 (1953); 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 447
(1954).
182 In State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 38 Ariz. 242, 5 P.2d
192 (1931), it was held premature to apply for discovery to the main trial
court when the only proceeding had been an appearance before a justice of

the peace.
183 6 NEW YORK UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW INsTrrTrrE PROCEEDnGS, 196
(1946). See the statement of G.Aaron Youngquist of the Rules Committee.
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accused of income tax evasion had been given free access to records in the possession of the government prior to the finding of the
indictment and defendant moved for inspection more than six
months after indictment and two weeks before the date for trial
and asked a continuance for trial to a period four months after
the date set for trial, discovery was properly denied. 184 In this
case the trial judge stated that ample discovery would be given the
defendant at the trial. And at the trial the defendant only once
sought production of particular papers, and his request was granted.
When a case is transferred from one district to another under
Rule 21(b) and the former district had allowed discovery, its decision will not be overturned by the transferee court even though it
deems that no good cause for discovery was shown.185
Suppose the defendant fails to ask for discovery before 18trial.
6
It would seem that he thereby waives his right to discovery.
Suppose the trial court denies discovery. What, if any, remedies
has the defendant? It has been held that the district court may reconsider its denial. 187 Suppose this too is denied. May the defendant have immediate relief before trial as by application to the court
of appeals for mandamus? There have been no cases granting such
relief. 18 8 Nor have there been any cases allowing an immediate
appeal as the order of denial seems to be regarded as an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable. 189
Suppose the trial court is proceeding improperly to permit discovery. May the prosecution apply to the appellate court for a writ
of prohibition to prevent such discovery? Mandamus was denied
as to a subpoena under Rule 17(c). 190 The New York Court of
Appeals in an opinion by Judge Cardozo permitted such applica184Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 282-284 (9th Cir. 1953).
185 United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
18 State v. Alleman, 218 La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83, 87 (1950).
187

United States v. Giglio, 17 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

Compare Moder v. United States, 62 F.2d 462, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
The defendant was permitted to use mandamus to compel discovery in Daly v.
Dimock, 55 Conn. 579, 12 AtI. 405 (1887); State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell,
123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936).
189 State v. Cicennia, 9 N.J. Super. 135, 75 A.2d 476, 478 (1950) citing
Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929) which regarded as interlocutory
an order denying return of papers, illegally taken from the defendant. Compare, however, State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
190 United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1948).
1S8
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tion 19 1 as did the Supreme Court of Arizona. 192 But no such procedure exists in Maryland. 19 3 The Supreme Court of New Jersey

has restricted inspection granted below on the prosecution's petition for certification. 194 Prohibition seems to be available in
Idaho, 19 5 and Missouri. 19 6 The prosecution went up by certiorari in
Minnesota, 197 and South Dakota. 19 8
Suppose the trial court denies discovery and the defendant is

tried and convicted. Appeal will now lie as there is a final judgment.
If there was an abuse of discretion in denying discovery, the Court
of Appeals should reverse and order a new trial. Reversal on appeal
is not likely. The Court of Appeals may stress the discretionary
character of the remedy. Sometimes it concludes that there was no
real injury to the defendant because full inspection was permitted
at the trial. 199 But where prejudice is shown, there should be a
200
reversal.
Suppose the trial court grants discovery and the trial takes

place and the defendant is acquitted. It would seem clear that the
government can take no appeal after the acquittal even though the

discovery was improperly allowed. 2 01
(TO

BE CoNTDNED)

191 People ex rel, Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84,
52 A.L.R. 200 (1927). Prohibition was granted on the facts of the case.
192 State v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 302 P.2d 263 (Ariz.
1956). On the facts of the case prohibition was held not to lie.
193 State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647, 653 (1947).
194 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) criticized 53
COLUm. L. REv. 1161 (1953). The prosecution took an appeal in State v.
Winne, 27 N.J. Super. 304, 99 A.2d 368 (1953).
195 Idaho Galena Mining Co. v. Judge of District Court, 47 Idaho 195,
273 Pac. 952 (1929).
196 State v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 25 S.W.2d 459 (1930).
197 State v. Steele, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128, 1918D Ann. Cas. 343
(1912).
198 State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100,
101 (1932).
199 United States v. Schiller, 187 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1951).
200 State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647, 649 (1947).
201 State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647, 649 (1947). See cases cited
in note on this case, 38 J. Cnum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 250 n.2 (1947);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 1 Ann. Cas. 655 (1904).
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